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a1. Introduction
Correcting  ﬁscal  imbalances  and  reducing  public  debt  is  a
priority  now  for  most  countries,  particularly  for  the  periph-
eral  countries  of  the  Eurozone  (namely  Greece,  Ireland,
Portugal,  Spain  and  Italy,  a.k.a.  GIPSI  countries).  Indeed,
public  debt  in  advanced  economies  has  climbed  to  its  high-
est  level  since  World  War  II,  now  exceeding  100%  of  GDP  (IMF,
2012d),  while  this  threshold  has  been  largely  surpassed  by
countries  like  Portugal,  Ireland,  Italy  and  Greece.1
There  is  no  consensus  about  which  policy  strategy  should
be  implemented  in  order  to  achieve  a  ﬁscal  consolida-
tion  while  not  jeopardizing  economic  growth.  The  debate
about  ﬁscal  austerity  vs.  economic  growth  is  bitter  now
among  researchers  and  practitioners.  Obviously,  both  ﬁscal
consolidation  and  economic  growth  are  desirable  outcomes,
but  while  some  authors  argue  in  favour  of  expansion-
ary  (non-Keynesian)  effects  of  austerity,  others  claim  it  is
self-defeating.  After  the  expansionary  ﬁscal  and  monetary
policies  of  2009,  most  countries  bet  for  austerity  at  that
time.  For  instance,  Corsetti  et  al.  (2010)  mention  how,  with
the  ongoing  economic  recovery,  the  goal  of  economic  poli-
cies  was  shifting  to  ﬁscal  exit  strategies,  including  both
tax  increases  and  sizeable  spending  cuts.  However,  most
advanced  economies  are  now  showing  a  growth  slowdown,
when  not  of  a  deep  recession.  The  recent  World  Economic
Outlook  by  the  IMF  (IMF,  2012d)  has  only  intensiﬁed  the
debate,  when  it  attributed  relevant  contractionary  effects
to  ﬁscal  austerity.
The  contribution  of  this  paper  is  threefold.  First,  we
provide  a  deep  insight  into  the  literature  on  public  debt
deleverage  and  the  effects  of  ﬁscal  consolidation,  in  search
for  a  synthesis  whenever  it  is  possible.  Second,  we  conduct
an  empirical  analysis  of  macroeconomic  scenarios  for  the
GIPSI  countries  to  highlight  the  relationship  between  the
sustainability  of  public  debt  and  different  levels  of  growth,
inﬂation,  ﬁscal  and  monetary  policies,  and  we  compare  our
results  with  those  of  the  recent  study  by  the  IMF  (IMF,
2012d).  Finally,  we  provide  a  policy  mix  that  would  be  the
most  suitable  for  these  ﬁve  countries,  in  order  to  achieve  a
combination  of  ﬁscal  consolidation  and  economic  growth,
according  to  the  theoretical  literature  and  the  empirical
ﬁndings  in  both  our  paper  and  the  IMF’s  research.
1 According to Eurostat, at the end of 2011 Portugal and Ireland
had a ratio of 108% of public debt over GDP, Italy 120% and Greece
165%. Spain was the only country to be analyzed in this article
that did not surpassed the 100% threshold yet (69%), though it was
expected to reach 90% by the end of 2012, according to IMF (IMF,
2012b) and the Spanish Government.
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bThe  rest  of  the  article  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2
eviews  the  theoretical  literature  on  public  debt  deleverage
nd  ﬁscal  consolidation.  We  search  for  synthesis  elements
hen  available,  while  stressing  the  main  points  of  contro-
ersy  otherwise.  In  Section  3  we  conduct  an  empirical  study
n  order  to  analyze  the  sustainability  of  the  public  debt  of
IPSI  countries  in  different  macroeconomic  scenarios.  Sec-
ion  4  compares  the  results  of  our  analysis  with  those  of  the
MF  (IMF,  2012d).  Finally,  we  provide  in  Section  5  a  policy  mix
o  achieve  both  ﬁscal  consolidation  and  economic  growth.
.  The state of the art on public debt
eleverage
eleveraging  an  economy  refers  to  the  process  of  reducing
ublic  and  private  debt  levels  expressed  as  a  ratio  of  total
ebt-to-GDP.  Deﬁned  as  the  subscription  of  debts  or  loans
hat  multiply  the  ﬁnancial  capacity  of  an  agent,  leverage
as  always  represented  a  common  means  of  ﬁnancing  by  the
tates.  This  way,  the  resources  raised  through  taxes  are  com-
lemented,  particularly  during  recessions,  with  the  issuing
f  new  debt.
The  virtues  of  ﬁnancial  leverage  are  a  classic  issue  in  the
iterature  of  corporate  ﬁnance,  from  the  irrelevance  of  cap-
tal  structure  under  ideal  conditions  (Modigliani  and  Miller,
958) to  the  multiplier  effect  of  indebtedness  (see,  for
xample,  the  literature  on  ﬁnancial  risk  and  leverage  mea-
ures  in  Briley  et  al.,  2010),  and  similar  interpretations  could
pply  to  public  debt.  However,  it  is  also  true  that  lever-
ge  conveys  a  substantial  increase  in  risk  exposure,  which
ight  become  harmful  if  a  ﬁnancial  crisis  occurs.  Indeed,  the
ecent  ﬁnancial  crisis  abruptly  ended  the  leveraging  process
f  the  private  sector,  while  the  increasing  exposure  to  debt
y  the  public  sector  was  a  consequence  of  both  automatic
tabilizers  and  the  expansionary  policies  that  most  countries
mplemented  at  that  time.
Then,  since  2010  most  economic  authorities  shifted  their
trategies  in  order  to  implement  a  ﬁscal  consolidation  that
ould  correct  ﬁscal  imbalances.  Since  1980,  84  advanced
nd  developing  economies  were  able  to  reduce  their  debt-
o-GDP  ratios  in  more  than  20  percentage  points  in  at  least
wo  years  (Finger  and  Sadikov,  2010).  Mean  debt  reduction
as  34%  of  GDP,  lasting  5  and  a  half  years,  with  a  primary
urplus  ratio  of  2.75%  of  GDP  on  average.  However,  in  many
ther  cases  the  success  has  only  been  moderate:  for  the
6  identiﬁed  episodes  by  the  IMF  (IMF,  2012d) during  the
0th  century,  the  median  debt-to-GDP  ratio  after  15  years
as  only  about  10  percentage  points  lower.  Things  seem  to
e  even  tougher  nowadays:  recent  ﬁscal  consolidation  pro-
esses  led  most  economies  into  a  recession  while  they  have
een  unable  to  correct  ﬁscal  imbalances  signiﬁcantly.
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Are  we  cursed?  Is  it  a  combination  of  ﬁscal  consolida-
ion  and  economic  growth  impossible  today?  To  answer  this
uestion,  let’s  ﬁrst  analyze  the  options  available.  Follow-
ng  McKinsey  (2011,  2012),  four  are  the  possible  deleverage
trategies.  First,  tighten  our  belts  (the  most  common  way
o  deleverage,  in  order  to  increase  net  savings,  is  to
educe  public  expenditures  during  a  long  period  of  ﬁscal
usterity);  second,  generate  inﬂation  because  a  higher  inﬂa-
ion  increases  nominal  GDP  growth,  making  debt-to-GDP
atios  lower2;  third,  debt  restructuring  and/or  default3;  and
ourth,  growing  at  a  higher  rate  than  the  debt  accumula-
ion  (if  an  economy  is  able  to  do  so,  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio
ecreases  automatically).4 Countries  that  undertook  suc-
essful  ﬁscal  consolidations  in  the  past  could  be  split  into
hree  groups:  oil-exporting  countries,  who  beneﬁted  from  a
avourable  situation;  countries  that  restructured  their  debt,
hey  received  support  from  their  creditors  and  exhibited  a
uick  recovery;  and  countries  that  were  able  to  combine
scal  consolidation  policies  with  a  favourable  dynamics  of
ebt.  Some  of  these  strategies  are  not  desirable  (default
hould  be  the  last  option),  while  other  experiences  are
ot  imitable  today  by  advanced  countries  (like  the  success
xperienced  during  catch  up  processes,  by  small  exporting
ountries,  etc.).
Henceforth,  a  successful  deleverage  process  critically
epends  on  being  able  to  combine  ﬁscal  consolidation,  inﬂa-
ion  and  growth.  However,  there  is  no  consensus  about
ow  to  do  it.  Indeed,  few  debates  in  Economics  are  so
ontroversial  as  the  effects  of  ﬁscal  policies  on  the  main
acroeconomic  variables  (particularly  on  consumption  and,
ence,  on  economic  growth),  whether  we  should  or  not  use
eﬁcits  and  debt  to  ﬁnance  ﬁscal  expenditures,  and  whether
usterity  might  have  expansionary  (non-Keynesian)  effects
ver  GDP  through  a  cost  of  debt  reduction.  Opinions  are,
uite  often,  conﬂicting,  so  making  up  a  synthesis  is  a  difﬁcult
ask.  On  one  hand,  a  school  of  thought  refuses  to  make  use
f  debt  to  overcome  a  recession,  an  opinion  summarized  by
tating  that  a  problem  created  by  debt  cannot  be  solved  by
unning  up  more  debt.  On  the  other  hand,  the  opposite  view
s  expressed  as  follows  by  Eggertsson  and  Krugman  (2012,  pp.
469--1471)
‘‘You  cannot  solve  a  problem  created  by  debt  by  running
up  more  debt’’ --  say  the  critics  (.  .  .). What  is  wrong  with
that  argument?  It  assumes,  implicitly,  that  debt  is  debt  --
it  does  not  matter  who  owes  the  money.  Yet  that  cannot
be  right;  (.  .  .) debt  is  money  we  owe  to  ourselves  (.  .  .):
the  level  of  debt  matters  only  if  the  distribution  of  that
debt  matters.
At  the  same  time,  the  heated  debate  about  the  effects  of
emand-side  policies  through  the  increase  of  public  spend-
ng  versus  ﬁscal  consolidation  is  illustrated  by  Cogan  et  al.
2010,  p.  282)  as  follows:
Macroeconomists  remain  quite  uncertain  about  the  quan-
titative  effects  of  ﬁscal  policy.  This  uncertainty  derives
2 The most relevant example might be Chile, from 1984 to 1991.
3 Historically, this strategy appears to be common after a severe
onetary crisis.
4 Like the U.S. did from 1938 to 1943.
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not  only  from  the  usual  errors  in  empirical  estimation
but  also  from  different  views  on  the  proper  theoretical
framework  and  econometric  methodology.
Theoretical  literature  on  deleverage  of  the  public  sec-
or  deals  with  three  broad  topics.  First,  the  role  of  public
ebt  as  a common  means  of  ﬁnancing  by  States,  summa-
ized  in  three  questions.  What  is  the  relationship  between
evels  of  debt  and  long  term  economic  growth?  Which  nega-
ive  effects  are  produced  by  high  stocks  of  debt  and  through
hich  mechanisms  are  those  effects  transmitted?  Is  there  a
hreshold  for  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  above  which  it  would  be
dvisable  to  start  a  deleverage  process?
A  second  debate  addresses  ﬁscal  consolidation.  Several
uestions  are  in  order.  Is  there  a  threshold  for  the  pub-
ic  deﬁcit  an  economy  should  not  exceed?  Is  it  appropriate
o  impose  a  zero-deﬁcit  rule?  Are  measures  of  structural
eﬁcits  reliable?  Could  ﬁscal  consolidation  generate  growth
nder  recessions  or,  equivalently,  is  austerity  expansionary?
s  it  preferable  a  smooth  and  gradual  consolidation  to  an
ggressive  one?  Should  ﬁscal  consolidation  be  implemented
y  increasing  revenues  or  by  cutting  expenses?  All  these
uestions  are  related  to  the  classic  debate  about  the  esti-
ation  of  the  government  spending  multiplier.
A  third  topic  refers  to  the  current  context  where  the
rocesses  of  ﬁscal  consolidation  and  deleverage  are  being
mplemented.  Given  private  sector  is  also  highly  indebted
nd  the  prospect  for  most  advanced  economies  is  a  low  eco-
omic  growth  for  some  time,  if  both  the  private  and  public
ectors  deleverage  at  the  same  time. . . who  is  to  be  lead-
ng  the  recovery?  Sure  the  other  side  of  the  problem  is  that
he  current  context  is  also  characterized  by  the  high  cost
f  debt  peripheral  countries  in  the  Eurozone  are  required
o  pay.  Given  this,  which  possibilities  do  their  governments
ave  to  keep  ﬁnancing  growth  with  new  debt?  Sections  3
nd  4  are  devoted  to  this  dilemma.  For  now,  let  us  exam-
ne  the  two  ﬁrst  topics:  the  role  of  public  debt  and  ﬁscal
onsolidation.
.1.  Public  debt
‘‘The  United  States  debt,  foreign  and  domestic,  was  the
price  of  liberty’’
Alexander  Hamilton5
Public  debt  has  always  been  commonly  used  by  national
nd  regional  governments  for  ﬁnancing  purposes.  National
udget  is  largely  ﬁnanced  through  different  taxes,  yet  these
re  usually  not  enough  to  cover  expenditures  assumed  by  the
uthorities,  particularly  in  the  recessive  phase  of  the  cycle.
hus,  the  generated  deﬁcit  must  be  ﬁnanced  by  means  of
ublic-debt  issuing.  Fig.  1  shows  the  public  debt-GDP  ratio
f  some  economies  throughout  the  last  17  years.However,  public-debt  accumulation  is  not  innocuous.
here  is  extensive  academic  consensus  on  the  harmful
ffects  of  high  public-debt  levels,  as  well  as  on  the
5 Alexander Hamilton was the ﬁrst United States Secretary
f the Treasury, from 1789 to 1795. Quoted on Public Debt,
he U.S. Department of the Treasury website (available at
ttp://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/).
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In  short,  the  most  extended  vision  is  that  making  use  of
debt  is  acceptable  as  long  as  it  is  sustainable  and  does  not
harm  long-term  growth.8 The  second  requirement  depends,
6 We  deal with 90 and 100% thresholds because they are reference
values. As Reinhart and Rogoff (2010a) point out, the 90% threshold
does not mean that growth will be normal at 89% and subpar at 91%,
as a 90 km/h speed limit does not mean that driving 89 km/h is safe
and 91 km/h leads to an accident with complete certainty.
7 See the concept of structural deﬁcit below.
8 Auerbach (2009) points out a third reason why  high debt lev-
els would not be desirable: the intergenerational nature of debtFigure  1  Public  
Source:  ECB  Statistical  Data  Warehouse.
available  mechanisms  through  which  these  levels  have  a
negative  impact  on  the  main  macroeconomic  aggregates.
Public  debt  has  several  negative  effects  on  economic
activity.  Firstly,  the  higher  public  debt  is,  the  higher  its
cost.  This  is  a  ceteris  paribus  effect,  since  interests  grow
even  when  average  ﬁnancing  rate  in  the  market  holds  cons-
tant.  Consequently,  this  effect  is  more  intense  when  higher
public-debt  ratios  lead  investors  to  demand  a  higher  return
for  the  purchased  securities,  so  debt  load  increases  twice
over.  Thus,  either  some  of  the  State-collected  taxes  are
devoted  to  unproductive  purposes  (repaying  debt’s  inter-
ests),  or  deﬁcit  must  be  resorted  to.  Secondly,  this  leads
to  a  further  negative  effect:  incurring  in  higher  levels  of
debt  may  demand  greater  ﬁnancing  through  deﬁcit,  which  is
incorporated  to  the  debt  stock,  thus  generating  a  spiral  that
may  turn  out  to  be  explosive  under  certain  circumstances
that  shall  be  analyzed  later.  Thirdly,  in  case  of  no  deﬁcit
ﬁnancing,  this  could  be  made  through  tax  collection.  How-
ever,  this  strategy  increases  economic  distortions  and  hence
inefﬁciency  (Barro,  1979).  Another  alternative  would  be  a
faster  money  creation  by  authorities,  though  this  might  lead
to  higher  inﬂation  and  inﬂation-related  distortions  (Sargent
and  Wallace,  1981).  Finally,  another  way  public  debt  might
harm  macroeconomic  variables  is  the  crowding-out  effect:
as  public  debt  produces  the  perception  of  greater  wealth  in
the  economy’s  private  sector,  it  may  reduce  the  accumula-
tion  of  real  assets  (Auerbach,  2009).
All  these  effects  would  explain,  according  to  literature,
the  existing  direct  relationship  between  high  debt  levels
and  lower  economic  growth.  Indeed,  Reinhart  and  Rogoff
(2009,2010a,b)  recently  proved  this  debt-growth  correlation
for  44  countries  throughout  200  years.  The  90%  threshold  for
the  debt-GDP  ratio  was  their  most  relevant  conclusion:
The  relationship  between  government  debt  and  real  GDP
growth  is  weak  for  debt/GDP  ratios  below  90%  of  GDP.
Above  the  threshold  of  90%,  median  growth  rates  fall
by  1%,  and  average  growth  falls  considerably  more.  The
threshold  for  public  debt  is  similar  in  advanced  and
emerging  economies  and  applies  for  both  the  post  World
War  II  period  and  as  far  back  as  the  data  permit  (often
well  into  the  1800s)  (Reinhart  and  Rogoff,  2010a).
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Posterior  empirical  studies  (Kumar  and  Woo,  2010;
ecchetti  et  al.,  2011)  proved  this  negative  correlation
etween  public  debt  and  growth  is  especially  intense  when
ebt  volume  approaches  100%  of  GDP.6 Nevertheless,  there  is
ome  debate  on  the  causal  effect  of  this  correlation.  Rein-
art  and  Rogoff  state  that  causality  is  bidirectional,  while
anizza  and  Presbitero  (2012a,b)  provide  empirical  evidence
hat  it  is  slow  economic  growth  episodes  which  lead  to  debt
ccumulation  and  not  the  other  way  around.
Accumulating  debt  therefore  does  not  seem  a good  busi-
ess.  This  is  not  surprising  either.  Everyone  would  prefer
wning  his  own  house  without  mortgages  and  having  debt-
ree  assets.  Then,  why  to  make  use  of  debt?  Because  though
veryone  would  prefer  to  avoid  the  mortgage  when  buying
 house,  for  many  young  people  this  would  be  equivalent  to
aving  to  save  money  for  30  years.  When  they  are,  say  55,
hey  could  thank  mum  and  dad  for  their  generous  hospital-
ty,  and  leave  their  house  to  buy  their  own  one. .  .  perhaps
 bit  too  late  now!  Likewise,  the  fact  that  States  ﬁnance
ong-term  investments  (e.g.,  motorways)  through  debt  is
ustiﬁable,  as  these  investments  are  meant  to  beneﬁt  both
resent  and  future  generations.  Making  use  of  deﬁcit  and
ebt  in  the  downward  stages  of  the  cycle  as  long  as  it  is  com-
ensated  by  surplus  in  upward  stages  does  not  seem  illogical
ither.7oad. According to this interpretation, public debt would be a bond
ransferred from present-day to future generations. Against this
pproach, other authors argue that both deﬁcit and debt can be
ssumed as long as they ﬁnance long-term investments, but not
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Table  1  Public  debt  barometer  for  several  countries  in  2012.a
PSR  2011  (1)  PSR  2012(f) (2) DebtGDP ×  (i  −  g)  (1)  −  (2)
Germany  1.6  1.0  −0.2  1.2
Italy 1.0  3.0  4.5  −1.5
France −2.6  −2.2  0.5  −2.7
U.S. −7.3  −6.1  −1.9  −4.2
U.K. −5.0  −5.3  −1.0  −4.3
Spain −6.1  −3.6  3.9  −7.5
Japan −9.1  −8.9  −1.3  −7.6
Ireland −6.7  −4.4  5.1  −9.5
Portugal −0.4 0.1 9.9 −9.8
Greece −2.2 −1.0 41.4 −42.4
Source: Own elaboration from ECB, IMF (2012a,b,c), Eurostat and Bloomberg.
a To calculate the primary ﬁscal surplus (or primary surplus ratio, PSR) for 2012 we used the IMF estimates (2012a). On the other
hand, to obtain the PSR for 2011 we used ECB Statistical Data Warehouse except for Ireland, U.S. and Japan, also IMF (2012a). Finally, to
calculate the required PSR according to the barometer of debt, we used 2011 data from Eurostat for the debt-to-GDP ratio, except Japan
(the latest available data is from 2010). Cost of debt is measured by nominal rates on 10-year Treasuries (details at the end of August
2012), according to Eurostat for European countries or Bloomberg for others. For the nominal growth rate of GDP we use estimates for
2012 from Eurostat for the euro area countries, while for the U.K., Japan and U.S. correct the estimated real growth for 2012 as the IMF
World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2012c) with the deﬂator estimated by Eurostat to these countries (and which is the latest data available
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ain the second quarter of 2012). Since these estimates use variou
though reasonably good.
s  already  mentioned,  on  the  around-100%  threshold  of  the
ebt-to-GDP  ratio.  Sustainability  depends,  apart  from  the
ccumulated  stock  of  debt,  on  the  cost  of  debt  and  the
conomic  growth.  The  golden  rule  of  long-term  debt  sus-
ainability  states  that:
if  the  average  rate  of  annual  nominal/real  growth  of  a
country  is  below  the  average  nominal/real  interest  rate
of  the  annual  cost  incurred  in  debt  reﬁnancing,  debt  will
become  unsustainable  and  investors  shall  give  up  ﬁnanc-
ing  it  (de  la  Dehesa,  2012a,b).
In  this  respect,  the  Kiel  Institute  Barometer  for  Public
ebt  (Bencek  and  Klodt,  2011)  considers  that,  for  the  public
ebt-GDP  ratio  to  hold  stable,  the  primary  surplus  ratio,9
SR,  must  be  equal  to  or  higher  than  the  debt-GDP  ratio
ultiplied  by  the  difference  between  the  debt’s  nominal
nterest  rate,  i,  and  GDP’s  annual  nominal  growth  rate,  g.
ormally,
SR≥ D × (i  −  g).  (1)
GDP
Hence,  in  order  to  remain  solvent  any  Government  that
annot  get  ﬁnanced  in  the  market  at  a  nominal  rate  below
urrent expenses. This is why some authors (e.g., de la Dehesa,
012a,b) suggest that public investment by EU countries (super-
ised by European Union (EU) authorities) should not be taken into
ccount in deﬁcit calculations, thus helping to generate growth, as
t occurs in US States.
9 The primary surplus ratio is the primary ﬁscal surplus relative
o GDP. Primary ﬁscal deﬁcit or surplus is the result obtained from
omparing total incomes and expenses in the public sector, exclud-
ng debt interest. This concept measures the part of ﬁscal deﬁcit or
urplus that can be directly controlled, since debt services is to a
arge extent conditioned by economy in general. The concept was
reated by the IMF in the 1990s to measure the amount that the
ifferent States promised to devote to pay their debt interests.
t
u
t
drces, comparison among countries is not entirely homogeneous,
ts  economic  growth  must  be  able  to  run  a  primary  surplus
atio.  Furthermore,  this  surplus  must  also  be  the  larger  the
igher  the  stock  of  debt  accumulated.  The  same  conclusion
s  drawn  by  a  recent  IMF  empirical  study  (Devries  et  al.,
011),  which  states  that,  according  to  the  analysis  of  173
scal  adjustments  in  17  OECD  countries  between  1978  and
009,  the  likelihood  of  a  ﬁscal  adjustment  in  a  given  country
ncreases  as  (i)  its  ﬁscal  imbalance  grows,  (ii)  its  growth
ate  falls,  and  (iii)  its  long-term  debt  interest  rate  increases.
able  1  shows  the  situation  as  of  2012  for  the  main  countries
n  the  Eurozone,  the  U.K.,  the  U.S.  and  Japan  regarding  ﬁscal
urplus  in  their  public  accounts  relative  to  that  required  by
he  golden  rule.  All  countries  except  Germany  fail  to  fulﬁl
he  required  ﬁscal  balance.
In  short,  these  are  the  three  recommendations  con-
ributed  by  academic  consensus.  Firstly,  control  primary
eﬁcit.  Secondly,  prioritize  the  use  of  deﬁcit  and  debt  to
nance  investment  instead  of  current  expenditures.  Thirdly,
rom  a  given  debt-to-GDP  threshold  deleveraging  seems
dvisable:  on  one  hand,  higher  ratios  damage  growth;  on
he  other  hand,  starting  a  deleverage  process  becomes  more
rgent  as  debt  cost  increases  relative  to  economic  growth.The  academic  consensus  only  reaches  this  far.  Regarding
he  use  of  debt,  new  Keynesian  and  neoclassic  economists
iffer  substantially,  since  the  former  have  always  been  more
Table  2  Gross  households  debt  (in  %  over  personal
income).
2000  2008
United  States  96  128
United Kingdom  105  160
Spain 69  130
Source: McKinsey Global Institute (2010) via Eggertsson and
Krugman (2012).
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prone  to  using  debt  as  a  ﬁscal  policy  due  to  the  positive
effects  of  growth  under  some  speciﬁc  conditions.  Keynesians
suggest  there  is  an  additional  reason  to  use  debt  that  would
be  particularly  relevant  in  situations  such  as  the  present
one:  when  the  (even  more  indebted)  private  sector  needs
to  be  relieved  by  the  public  sector.  Table  2  shows  the  strong
increase  of  debt  in  national  economies  in  the  years  before
the  crisis  outbreak  in  three  different  countries.
The  concept  of  balance  sheet  recession,  developed  by
Koo  (2008),  argues  that  the  present-day  crisis,  as  well  as
Japan’s  crisis  two  decades  ago,  would  be  characterized  by
high  levels  of  private  debt.  In  this  context,  de-capitalization
of  companies  and  banks  in  face  of  the  signiﬁcant  drop  in
prices  of  assets  (e.g.,  toxic  assets)  in  their  balance  sheets
renders  monetary  policies  ineffective:  companies  assume
no  more  debts  when  rates  are  at  0%,  because  their  main
problem  is  precisely  debt!  Companies  change  their  objec-
tive  of  maximizing  proﬁts  to  minimizing  debts  and,  even
with  0%  rates,  employ  the  generated  resources  to  reduce
debt.  The  orthodox  theory  cannot  explain  this  behaviour:
if  their  managers  are  ‘‘so  stupid’’  [sic]  not  to  beneﬁt  from
money  at  0%  rate,  why  should  they  keep  on  running  these
companies?  The  best  they  could  do  is  giving  money  back  to
shareholders  and  close!  --  says  Koo.
Bearing  in  mind  this  and  other  concepts,  Eggertsson  and
Krugman  (2012)  argue  that  the  need  to  deleverage  by  the
private  sector  is  a  favourable  reason  to  increase  public  debt
in  the  current  situation.10 When  a  signiﬁcant  part  of  the
economy  is  debt-constrained  it  leads  to  a  depressed  aggre-
gate  demand,  since  large  sectors  of  the  economy  are  unable
to  spend  due  to  their  excessive  debt.  If  deleveraging  in  the
private  sector  is  large  enough,  the  economy  ends  up  against
the  zero  lower  bound  (ZLB);  the  economy  is  then  likely  to  fall
into  a  liquidity  trap;  price  drop  leads  to  increased  debt  load,
extending  the  initial  shock  effect;  the  paradoxes  of  frugal-
ity  and  effort  (Eggertsson,  2010)  would  emerge  in  a  context
of  rigid  prices  while  increasing  price  ﬂexibility  would  only
worsen  the  debt  crisis;  ﬁnally,  more  (public)  debt,  by  means
of  expansive  ﬁscal  policies,  may  be  the  solution  to  a  debt-
induced  slump.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that,  precisely  when
the  private  sector  is  debt-constrained,  the  Ricardian  equiv-
alence  breaks  down,11 current  consumption  would  depend
on  the  current  income,  the  multiplier  of  public  spending
would  be  over  1  and,  thus,  all  this  would  logically  support
expansive  ﬁscal  policies.
Some  authors  have  recently  offered  similar  arguments.
Hall  (2011)  argues  that  households’  restrictions  due  to  high
debt  levels  are  essential  to  explain  the  crisis  in  the  U.S.  Mian
and  Suﬁ  (2011a,b)  also  show  that  differences  in  debt  over-
hang  across  U.S.  counties  explain  the  higher  unemployment
10 Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) cite three antecedents to their
model: the argument of Fisher (1933) that Great Depression was due
to a vicious circle in which the fall of the prices of assets increased
the real debt load; the theory on the cyclical instability of credit by
Minsky (1986), where long periods of prosperity lead to indulgence
regarding debts and the virtues of leverage; and the concept of
balance sheet recession by Koo (2008), according to which large
sectors of the economy are unable to spend due to their excessive
debt.
11 See Section 2.2.
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aFigure  2  Accumulated  quarterly  GDP  (base  100  =  4Q  2007).
ource:  Own  elaboration  from  Eurostat.
ates  in  some  regions.  Anyway,  this  Keynesian  approach  sug-
esting  higher  (public)  debt  may  resolve  a  (private)  debt
roblem  leads  to  the  classical  debate  on  the  government
pending  multiplier  and  the  goodness  of  ﬁscal  policies  versus
he  neoclassical  concept  of  expansive  austerity.
.2.  Fiscal  consolidation
fter  the  Keynesian  stimuli  that  were  implemented  since
ate  2008  to  solve  world  ﬁnancial  crisis,  economic  pol-
cy  recommendations  have  changed  since  2010  towards  an
pproach  more  focused  on  ﬁscal  consolidation.  This  should
elp  ensure  the  sustainability  of  public  ﬁnances,  highly
amaged  by  the  expansive  policies  and  by  the  fall  of  tax
ollection  in  a  context  of  strong  recession.  Some  academics
lso  supported  the  idea  that  a  ﬁscal  consolidation  strategy
ould  be  welcomed  by  debt  markets,  thus  increasing  agents’
onﬁdence  in  the  government’s  capacity  to  solve  the  cri-
is  and,  consequently,  producing  non-Keynesian  effects  on
he  economic  activity.  This  would  be  the  so-called  expansive
usterity.
However,  the  economic  performance  by  most  economies,
articularly  in  southern  Europe,  since  mid-2011  and  the
rospects  of  European  and  international  authorities  point
ut  to  a  double  dip,  or  to  an  economic  stagnation  at  best,
s  shown  in  Fig.  2.
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et  al.,  2004).  Most  empirical  results  estimate  a  multiplier
value  that  ranges  between  0.8  (Barro,  1981)  and  1.2  (Ramey,
2011).  Therefore,  it  is  hard  to  argue  that  the  public  spending
14 The new Keynesian model of rational expectations and price
rigidity has been criticized for both being too Keynesian or not Key-
nesian enough (Cogan et al., 2010). On one hand, it would be not
Keynesian enough as it assumes rational expectations and optimiza-
tion of spending decisions. Thus, other models assume that either
some share of consumers follows rules-of-thumb, or that house-
holds are constrained to consume all their current income (e.g.,
Galí et al., 2007). On the other hand, those who consider it too
much Keynesian consider it assumes sticky prices in a mechanical
way that ampliﬁes Keynesian effects on aggregate demand (Chari
et al., 2009).
15 See Section 3.
16 Some authors do not see it this way. Mankiw (2006), for instance,
states that since the 1970s macroeconomists have focused too much
on conceptual fundamentals, yet scarcely on macroeconomics as
a tool to solve practical problems through the implementation of
monetary and ﬁscal policies. In Mankiw’s words, the problem is that
God put macroeconomists on Earth not to propose and test elegant
theories but to solve practical problems (p. 29).
17 Woodford (2009) points out ﬁve elements in the New Neoclas-8  
The  performance  is  particularly  negative  in  the  Eurozone,
he  world  region  with  the  lowest  economic  growth  in  the  last
wo  consecutive  decades;  simultaneous  ﬁscal  contraction  in
ll  its  member  countries  is  currently  aggravating  this  sit-
ation.  Authorities  and  academics  are  now  concerned:  Can
scal  consolidation  indeed  generate  growth  in  this  recessive
ontext?  That  is,  is  austerity  expansive?  Are  slow  and  gradual
onsolidations  preferable  to  more  aggressive  strategies?  Is  it
referable  to  consolidate  by  increasing  revenues  or  reducing
pending?  All  these  questions  lead  to  the  debate  on  the  value
f  the  government  spending  multiplier.12
There  is  no  consensus  either  in  theoretical  or  empiri-
al  literature  on  the  effects  of  expansionary  ﬁscal  policy.
heoretical  literature  is  divided  into  two  approaches:  neo-
lassical  of  real  business  cycle  (RBC)  models  (Aiyagari
t  al.,  1992;  Baxter  and  King,  1993),  and  new  Keynesian
Rotemberg  and  Woodford,  1992;  Devereux  et  al.,  1996).  A
asic  difference  that  explains  the  diverging  results  between
oth  approaches  is  the  concept  of  Ricardian  equivalence13 of
ublic  debt:  it  is  indifferent  whether  a  government  ﬁnances
 particular  public  spending  level  through  debt  or  taxes,  as
t  has  no  ﬁrst-order  effects  on  aggregate  demand,  interest
ates,  private  investment,  etc.  (Barro,  1979).  Why?  Because
onsumers  act  as  if  they  lived  an  inﬁnite  life  (as  a  dynasty)
nd  consequently  issuing  public  debt  would  have  no  net
arginal  effect  on  their  wealth  as  long  as  there  is  an
perational  chain  for  intergenerational  wealth  transfer  that
onnect  present-day  and  future  generations  (Barro,  1974).
n  other  words,  given  that  debt  must  be  eventually  paid
presumably  with  higher  taxes  in  the  future),  consumers  per-
eive  the  choice  between  raising  taxes  or  issuing  new  debt
s  equivalent  to  paying  taxes  today  or  in  the  future.
In  this  situation,  the  neoclassical  RBC  approach  states
hat  the  optimal  response  of  consumers  to  a  permanent
ncrease  in  public  spending  is  reducing  consumption  and
ncreasing  their  labour  offer  (Ramey,  2011).  The  govern-
ent  spending  multiplier  would  then  be  below  1  due  to  this
rowding-out  effect  motivated  by  the  negative  wealth  effect
f  higher  taxes  today  or  in  the  next  future  (Baxter  and  King,
993).  The  timing  of  tax  collection  is  irrelevant  if  collected
n  a  lump  sum  basis,  i.e.  if  the  Ricardian  equivalence  holds
Cogan  et  al.,  2010).
On  the  contrary,  the  standard  new  Keynesian  model
Rotemberg  and  Woodford,  1999)  predicts  that  a  permanent
ncrease  in  public  spending  leads  to  increased  private  con-
umption,  actual  wages,  and  productivity,  amplifying  the
ffects  of  tax  policies  (Galí  et  al.,  2007).  According  to  the
S-LM  model,  non-Ricardian  consumers  whose  consumption
epends  on  their  current  disposable  income  are  assumed.
n  spite  of  this,  unlike  the  old  Keynesian  school,  the  stan-
ard  new  Keynesian  model  does  assume  agents’  rational
xpectations,  yet  combined  with  some  sort  of  price  rigidity
Cogan  et  al.,  2010)  motivated  by  oligopolistic  competition
12 That is, the increase of the annual GDP growth rate with an
xpansive ﬁscal policy or, alternatively, the reduction of the annual
DP growth rate per each percentage point of ﬁscal deﬁcit reduc-
ion relative to DGP (increasing ﬁscal incomes and/or reducing
ublic spending).
13 David Ricardo was, back in the 19th century, the ﬁrst author who
roposed this theory, and Robert Barro retook it in the 1970s.
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nd  increasing  returns  to  scale  (Ramey,  2011).  Several  mod-
ﬁcations  to  this  base  model  have  been  proposed,  bringing
t  closer  to  the  neoclassical  or  more  traditional  Keynesian
nterpretations.14
The  debate  between  both  theoretical  models  would  be
olved  with  clear  empirical  evidence  in  favour  of  any  of
hem,  yet  this  is  not  the  case.15 However,  some  progress
as  been  made  and  there  is  a  growing  consensus  now,16 from
ethodological  aspects  (e.g.,  Woodford  (2009)17 contributes
 complete  review  on  this  issue)  to  policy  recommendations.
ocusing  on  the  latter,  the  main  consensus  elements  are
eferred  to:  (i)  the  value  of  the  multiplier  both  in  general
nd  under  special  circumstances;  (ii)  ﬁscal  consolidation
hrough  reduced  public  spending  or  increased  tax  collection;
iii)  the  short-  and  long-term  effects  of  ﬁscal  consolidation;
nd  (iv)  the  suitable  timing  of  ﬁscal  consolidation.
.2.1.  The  government  spending  multiplier
ew  Keynesian  general  equilibrium  models  estimate  the
alue  of  the  public  spending  multiplier  in  normal  circum-
tances  could  be  above  or  below  1  depending  on  the
ay  agents’  preferences  are  speciﬁed  (Galí  et  al.,  2007;
onacelli  and  Perotti,  2008).  Alternatively,  RBC  models  gen-
rally  obtain  a  below-1  multiplier  (Aiyagari  et  al.,  1992;
axter  and  King,  1993;  Ramey  and  Shapiro,  1998;  Burnsideical Synthesis (macroeconomic examples of formerly contentious
ssues about which there is wide consensus nowadays). Firstly,
acroeconomic analysis is widely accepted to use coherent inter-
emporal general equilibrium foundations. Secondly, quantitative
nalysis of economic policies should be based on econometrically
alidated structural models. Thirdly, it is important to model expec-
ations as endogenous, so that policy analysis takes into account
he way in which expectations may differ if alternative policy were
o be implemented. Fourthly, real perturbations are an important
ource of economic ﬂuctuations, including not only RBC techno-
ogical shocks but also those referred to the agents’ preferences
r public policies. Finally, monetary policy is considered effective,
specially as a mechanism for inﬂation control.
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multiplier  is,  generally  speaking,  substantially  larger  than  1
(Christiano  et  al.,  2011).
However,  things  change  under  abnormal  circumstances.
On  one  hand,  multipliers  are  usually  higher  during  a  reces-
sion  (de  la  Dehesa,  2012a).  Thus,  this  would  be  an  argument
against  ﬁscal  consolidations,  at  least  aggressive  ones,  in
bad  times.  Besides,  most  of  the  new  Keynesian  literature  is
focused  on  the  effectiveness  of  ﬁscal  policies  in  a  particular
case  of  economic  recession:  that  in  which  monetary  policies
prove  to  be  ineffective  under  a  ZLB  constraint.  Recent  works
contribute  evidence  in  favour  of  ﬁscal  policy  effectiveness
in  a  ZLB  context  (see  Bodenstein  et  al.  (2009)  for  open
economies,  Braun  and  Waki  (2006),  and  Coenen  and  Wieland
(2003)  on  Japan’s  experience  in  the  1990s,  or  Christiano
et  al.  (2011)).18 The  last  authors  make  use  of  a  dynamic-
stochastic  general  equilibrium  model  proposed  by  Altig  et  al.
(2011)  to  estimate  the  value  of  the  multiplier.  They  prove
it  is  generally  below  1  when  the  central  bank’s  monetary
policy  follows  the  Taylor  rule,  yet  it  largely  exceeds  1  when
nominal  interest  rates  does  not  respond  to  public-spending
increases  as  it  happens  in  a  ZLB  context.
Therefore,  according  to  Keynesian  models  ﬁscal  consol-
idations  in  a  ZLB  context  would  be  contractive,19 while
expansive  ﬁscal  policies  would  lead  to  increased  GDP,  higher
marginal  costs,  and  inﬂationist  expectations.  With  rates
stuck  at  0%,  inﬂation  reduces  real  interest  rates,  thus  pro-
moting  private  sector  spending,  and  increasing  production
again.  .  . and  so  on,  until  equilibrium  is  reached  for  a  higher
production  and  inﬂation  levels.  Other  authors  suggest  other
economic  policies  in  a  ZLB  context  that  are  alternative
to  expansionary  ﬁscal  policies.  Eggertsson  and  Woodford
(2003),  for  instance,  suggest  central  banks  should  commit
to  higher  future  inﬂation.  Others  recommend  designing  a
tax  combination  to  escape  ZLB:  Feldstein  (2003)  proposed
Japan  authorities  should  increase  value-added  tax  by  1%
each  term  and  simultaneously  reduce  income  taxes  equiv-
alently  during  several  years,  whereas  Correia  et  al.  (2010)
also  recommended  a  combination  of  consumption,  income
and  capital  taxes,  together  with  an  appropriate  monetary
policy.
2.2.2.  Consolidation  through  reduced  public  spending  or
increased  taxes?
Another  large  consensus  is  in  regard  the  role  that  public
spending  and  taxes  must  play  in  ﬁscal  consolidation.  In  this
sense,  consolidations  based  on  public  spending  cuts  are  more
effective  than  those  based  on  tax  increases.  Alesina  and
Ardagna  (1998)  show  that  the  composition  of  this  adjustment
is  a  determinant  factor  of  success  in  a  ﬁscal  consolidation.
18 Other two previous essays include Christiano (2004) and
Eggertsson (2004).
19 Christiano et al. (2011) explain the mechanism through which
ﬁscal consolidation in a ZLB context would be contractive: for a spe-
ciﬁc fall in product, marginal costs are reduced and prices fall. With
staggered prices, the fall of prices leads agents to anticipate future
deﬂation, so real interest rates increase due to ZLB restriction. This
perverse increase in real interest rates rises the desired saving rate,
thus increasing the necessary fall in production to reduce desired
savings to zero. This scenario reminds that of the thrift paradox
(Keynes, 1936; Krugman, 1998).
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ombining  adjustments  focused  on  public  spending  --  prefer-
bly  cuts  in  transfers,  social  expenditures,  and  wage
oderation  for  public  employees  --  together  with  mone-
ary  devaluation,  are  more  effective  and  long-lasting  than
he  adjustments  based  on  tax  increases,  even  when  the
atter  are  also  accompanied  by  monetary  devaluation.  Tax
ncreases  do  not  lead  to  permanent  consolidation  of  public
nances,  so  long-term  interest  rates  would  not  fall,  though
gents’  conﬁdence  and  economic  growth  they  would.
Keynesian  literature  reaches  a  quite  similar  conclusion,
et  nuanced.  Unlike  the  neoclassical  model,  public  spend-
ng  cuts  are  expected  to  have  greater  contractive  effects
han  tax  increases.  Symmetrically,  expansionary  ﬁscal  poli-
ies  render  greater  effectiveness  when  they  are  generated
y  public  spending  increase  than  through  tax  reductions
Alesina  and  Ardagna,  1998).  However,  once  expansionary
scal  policies  have  been  applied  (as  it  occurred  in  2009),
 key  result  of  these  models  (e.g.,  Corsetti  et  al.,  2009,
010) is  that  the  effectiveness  of  ﬁscal  policies  increases
hen  a  correction  of  these  measures  in  the  medium-term  by
eans  of  spending  reversals  are  anticipated.  As  explained
y  Corsetti  et  al.  (2010),  the  fall  of  private  consumption
redicted  by  the  Ricardian  equivalence  is  avoided  if  the
dditional  spending  is  initially  ﬁnanced  with  debt  but  subse-
uently  offset  through  a  period  of  below-trend  government
pending  (during  the  positive  stage  of  the  economic  cycle).  If
o,  private  consumption  would  behave  symmetrically  to  pub-
ic  spending,  rising  above  trend  after  a more  stable  initial
tage.  The  argument  that  supports  this  private  consumption
ynamics  is  the  credibility  that  a  public  spending  reversal
ill  take  place.
.2.3.  Short-  and  long-term  effects  of  ﬁscal
onsolidation
here  is  also  wide  consensus  regarding  the  fact  that  the
eneﬁts  of  ﬁscal  consolidation  are  usually  more  evident
and  feasible)  in  the  long  than  in  the  short  term,  although
nterpretations  regarding  adjustment  intensity  vary  among
odels.  Generally  speaking,  ﬁscal  consolidation  procedures
nvolve  short-term  costs  in  terms  of  growth,  yet  long-term
eneﬁts  (Hernández  de  Cos  and  Thomas,  2012).  Short-term
ontractive  effects  are  evident  in  the  Keynesian  model,
specially  if  ﬁscal  consolidation  is  implemented  through
pending  cuts.  On  the  contrary,  neoclassical  empirical
iterature  does  identify  episodes  in  which  ﬁscal  consolida-
ions  have  non-Keynesian  short-term  effects  (Giavazzi  and
agano,  1990;  Alesina  et  al.,  1998;  Perotti,  1999).  Alesina
nd  Ardagna  (1998),  and  Alesina  et  al.  (2012)  argue  that  the
omposition  of  the  ﬁscal  adjustment  is  a  key  factor,  since
hose  based  on  public  spending  cuts  are  less  costly  in  terms
f  GDP  loss  than  those  based  on  tax  increases.20
Regarding  long-term  beneﬁts,  Keynesian  models  subor-
inate  the  effectiveness  of  ﬁscal  consolidations  (through
ublic  spending  reversals)  to  a  subsequent  time  hori-
on.  Alternatively,  the  neoclassic  approach  considers  ﬁscal
20 Nevertheless, Galí et al. (2007) argue that the evidence of
on-Keynesian effects shown by Alesina and Ardagna (1998) is no
vidence in favour of the neoclassical model because, on aver-
ge, public spending cuts lead to increases in both production and
onsumption (p. 235).
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another  guaranteed  controversy. .  .  For  instance,  Andrés  and
Doménech  (2012)  estimate  the  potential  growth  and  struc-
tural  deﬁcit  for  Spain,  and  prove  that  maintaining  the  3%
22 All countries except the U.K. and Czech Republic.
23 Formally known as Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Gov-
ernance in the Economic and Monetary Union, it was expected to0  
djustments  based  on  public  spending  cuts  are  not  reces-
ive  unlike  tax  increases,  which  would  lead  to  long  and  deep
ecessions  (Alesina  et  al.,  2012).  Fiscal  consolidation  policies
ased  on  public  spending  cuts  would  also  be  more  effective
f  accompanied  by  pertinent  structural  reforms.  Adjust-
ent  composition  is  also  relevant:  cuts  in  public  investment
ould  have  negative  long-term  effects,  while  reducing  of
ublic  employees’  remunerations  (wages  and  public  employ-
ent)  would  generate  greater  beneﬁts  in  the  long-term
Hernández  de  Cos  and  Thomas,  2012).  In  any  case  and  what-
ver  approach  is  put  into  practice,  once  ﬁscal  consolidation
as  managed  to  reduce  the  debt-to-DGP  ratio,  the  reduced
nterest  burden  would  have  positive  effects  on  long-term
rowth.
.2.4.  The  timing  of  ﬁscal  consolidation
n  this  case  we  cannot  talk  about  univocal  evidence,  but
bout  a  prevailing  opinion  trend  in  the  last  months  in  favour
f  the  implementation  of  slow  and  gradual  consolidations.
his  is  visible  in  the  decisions  to  delay  and/or  moderate  ﬁs-
al  consolidation  requirements  of  countries  such  as  Spain  or
ortugal,  as  well  as  in  academic  papers  and  IMF  public  state-
ents.  For  instance,  the  main  conclusion  of  the  recent  IMF
orking  Paper  by  Batini  et  al.  (2012)  states  that
(.  .  .) smooth  and  gradual  consolidations  are  to  be
preferred  to  frontloaded  or  aggressive  consolidations,
especially  for  economies  in  recession  facing  high  risk  pre-
mia  on  public  debt,  because  sheltering  growth  is  key  to
the  success  of  ﬁscal  consolidation  in  these  cases.  (p.  1)
This  view  defends  that  --  as  long  as  there  is  ﬁscal  margin
-  a  growth-based  strategy  and  a  smooth  ﬁscal  consolidation
ight  be  more  effective.  However,  this  is  more  a  recent
pinion  trend  than  a  generalized  consensus.  For  instance,
ernández  de  Cos  and  Thomas  (2012)  support  a  more  vig-
rous  consolidation  process,  particularly  in  situations  like
hat  of  Spain,  characterized  by  high  levels  of  foreign  debt
nd  strong  dependence  on  foreign  saving.  In  this  situation,
ublic  spending  cuts  might  be  expected  to  generate  a  signiﬁ-
ant  positive  effect  in  terms  of  ensuring  the  ﬂow  of  external
unds  to  the  economy  and  at  a  lower  cost.
Once  we  have  dealt  with  the  issues  on  which  academic
onsensus  has  been  reached  regarding  appropriate  ﬁscal
onsolidation,  timing  and  composition,  we  shall  pose  a  last
uestion  on  budget  stability  of  public  administrations.  If
he  objective  is  a  balanced  budget,  is  there  a  public  deﬁcit
hreshold  that  should  not  be  exceeded  in  any  case?  Should
his  threshold  apply  in  every  ﬁscal  year  or  should  we  opt  for longer-term  control?
Convergence  criteria  approved  in  the  Maastricht  Treaty
n  1993  for  the  adoption  of  Euro  as  a  common  currency
mposed,  regarding  public  ﬁnances,21 a  3%  limit  on  the
21 Remember that the Maastricht Treaty also approved other three
onvergence criteria: regarding the inﬂation rate, which should not
xceed 1.5% average inﬂation in the three European countries with
ower inﬂation rate; regarding the exchange rate, that the national
urrency must not be devaluated at least during two consecutive
ears after joining the European Monetary System; and regarding
ong-term interest rates, that the risk premium was not to exceed
00 basis points relative to the three countries with lower inﬂation.
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nnual  public  deﬁcit-to-GDP  ratio  and  a  60%  limit  on  the
ccumulated  public  debt-to-GDP  ratio.  More  recently,  25
ut  of  the  27  EU  member  States22 approved  --  with  the  aim
f  solving  the  Euro  crisis  --  the  European  Fiscal  Compact  in
arch  2012.23 This  Fiscal  Treaty  settles  a  new  golden  rule:
hile  the  required  public  debt  ratio  is  equivalent  to  that  in
he  Maastricht  Treaty  (when  public  debt  exceeds  60%  GDP,
atio  must  be  reduced  at  an  average  pace  of  1/20  every
ear),  the  public  deﬁcit  requirement  is  more  demanding.
he  norm  pursues  a  budget  equilibrium  or  surplus  in  public
dministrations.  With  this  purpose,  the  lower  limit  for  the
nnual  structural  deﬁcit  is  set  at  0.5%  GDP  as  a  medium-term
bjective.  Only  when  the  debt-to-GDP  ratio  is  far  below  60%
nd  risks  for  long-term  sustainability  of  public  ﬁnances  are
ow,  this  limit  may  reach  1%.
Thus,  the  Maastricht  Treaty  imposed  a  3%  limit  on  public
eﬁcit,  while  the  current  Fiscal  Treaty  demands  0.5%.  How-
ver,  both  ﬁgures  are  not  comparable,  since  there  are  two
mportant  differences  in  their  measurement.24 Firstly,  the
.5%  limit  in  the  Fiscal  Treaty  is  a  medium-term  objective,
o  member  States  can  only  deviate  from  it  temporarily  under
xceptional  circumstances.25 The  automatic  activation  of  a
orrector  mechanism  is  scheduled  in  case  of  signiﬁcant  devi-
tions  from  the  medium-term  objective  or  the  adjustment
ath.  Secondly,  the  speciﬁed  limit  corresponds  to  the  annual
tructural  balance  ratio  on  GDP.  Annual  structural  balance
f  public  administrations  is  understood,  according  to  the
reaty,  as  the  annual  cyclically  adjusted  balance  net  of  one-
ff  and  temporary  measures.  Structural  deﬁcit  is  therefore
eferred  to  the  deﬁcit  that  must  be  met  throughout  the
conomic  cycle,  allowing  deﬁcit  in  recessive  years  to  be
ompensated,  necessarily,  by  surplus  in  growing  years.
The  concept  of  structural  deﬁcit  involves,  however,
easurement  problems.  Cyclical  components  are  not
bservable,  but  must  be  estimated  by  means  of  highly  com-
lex,  dynamic,  factorial  and  discrete  regime  change  models
de  la  Dehesa,  2012b).  Thus,  it  will  be  difﬁcult  to  determine
he  stage  of  the  economic  cycle  a  country  is  at  any  moment.
easurements  should  be  made  by  an  independent  research
entre  such  as  the  National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research
NBER)  in  the  U.S.,  and  not  by  the  EU  Commission.  Justnter into force on January 1, 2013.
24 The 0.5% golden rule for structural deﬁcit-to-GDP ratio supple-
ents the 3% limit required by the Maastricht Treaty. However,
erhelst (2012) proves that the norm approved by the Fiscal Treaty
ill impose much stricter ﬁscal rigour.
25 Exceptional circumstances mean unusual events out of the con-
rol of the affected contracting party that have a signiﬁcant impact
n the ﬁnancial situation of public administrations, or those periods
f serious economic recession according to the revised Stability and
rowth Pact, as long as the temporal deviation by the affected con-
racting party does not put medium-term budgetary sustainability
t risk (Art. 3.3.b in the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Gov-
rnance in the Economic and Monetary Union; European Council,
012).
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Table  3  GDP  growth,  GDP  deﬂator,  stock  of  debt  and  10-year  bond  interest  rates.
GDP  growth  GDP  deﬂator  Public  debt
Long  term  Short  term  Long  term  Short  term  Stock  10y  rate
Spain  2.18%  0.03%  3.32%  1.73%  70%  6.58%
Italy 0.81%  −0.73%  2.75%  2.06%  120%  5.82%
Ireland 4.50%  −0.70%  2.36%  −1.19%  110%  5.91%
Portugal 1.36%  −0.67%  2.04%  1.45%  110%  9.89%
.40%
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Source: European Commission (2012), Eurostat and ECB.
public  deﬁcit-to-GDP  objective  in  the  Stability  Programme26
by  2013,  with  a  0.6%  economic  growth  forecasted  that
year,  would  be  equivalent  to  imposing  a  balanced  struc-
tural  deﬁcit  seven  years  before  the  expected  deadline  in
the  Budgetary  Stability  Pact!
Finally,  an  even  more  demanding  norm  is  to  be  imple-
mented  in  Spain  after  the  Budgetary  Stability  Pact  (Ley
de  Estabilidad  Presupuestaria,  BOE;  April  30,  2012)  was
approved,  setting  up  the  zero-deﬁcit  objective:
no  public  administration  can  incur  structural  deﬁcit,
deﬁned  as  cycle-adjusted  deﬁcit,  including  exceptional
and  temporal  measures,
within  a  time  horizon  to  achieve  it  by  2020.  Some  authors
(Verhelst,  2012;  Whelan,  2012)  point  out  that  the  European
and  Spanish  norms  will  impose  stronger  restrictions  to  the
use  of  ﬁscal  policies  as  measures  for  economic  stabiliza-
tion,  although  there  is  no  consensus  regarding  this  issue,
since  there  is  no  consensus  on  the  goodness  of  ﬁscal  pol-
icy  either.  In  any  case,  what  does  not  seem  reasonable  is  to
account  long-term  public  investments  in  structural  deﬁcit
calculations.27 Finally,  it  seems  to  be  a  growing  consensus
on  the  idea  that  the  Fiscal  Treaty  should  also  be  accompa-
nied  by  a  ﬁscal  union  --  including  a  European  Treasury  that
issues  public  debt  common  to  all  States  known  as  Eurobonds
--  as  well  as  bank  union  that  empowers  the  ECB  as  a  true
lender  of  last  resort.
3. Growth, inﬂation, monetary policy, and the
sustainability  of public debt
To  better  understand  the  growth  versus  austerity  dilemma
we  examine  the  relationship  among  ability  to  deleverage,
growth  and  inﬂation  by  using  data  from  the  GIPSI  countries.
Then  we  compare  our  results  with  ﬁndings  of  the  recent
analysis  by  the  IMF  (IMF,  2012d)  regarding  several  historical
26 Remember that they were subsequently softened.
27 As explained by de la Dehesa (2012a,b), the golden rule should
not be named that way because it has nothing to do with the so-
called golden rule introduced by Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of
the American Treasury, in 1790. According to this rule, the Federal
Treasury assumed the debt of all member States as long as a simple
and effective rule was met: debt had to be aimed for investment
purposes, not for ﬁnancing current expenses. That is, this golden
rule allows States to have a deﬁcit as long as it has been completely
invested and it holds for more than two consecutive years, unless
in exceptional situations.
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pisodes  during  the  20th  century  where  public  debt  rose
bove  100%  of  GDP.  To  analyze  and  understand  the  factors
hat  determine  the  sustainability  of  the  public  debt,  we
pply  the  methodology  of  the  Barometer  of  public  debt  by
iel  Institute  (Bencek  and  Klodt,  2011).  We  ﬁrst  examine  in
etail  the  case  of  Spain  and  then  we  compare  the  results
ith  those  of  the  rest  of  the  GIPSI  countries.
Bencek  and  Klodt  (2011)  empirical  assessment  concludes
hat  it  is  extremely  difﬁcult  for  a  country  to  prevent  its  debt
rom  increasing  inﬁnitely  when  the  necessary  PSR  reaches  a
ritical  level  of  more  than  5%.  Most  countries  that  exceeded
his  level  for  some  time  eventually  needed  outside  help
o  deal  with  their  debt.  What  we  do  is  to  test  whether
ebt  would  reach  or  not  that  threshold  in  different  macroe-
onomic  scenarios.  First,  we  combine  high  and  low  real
conomic  growth  with  low  and  moderate  inﬂation  (in  terms
f  GDP  deﬂator),  so  we  get  four  scenarios  for  each  coun-
ry.  Simultaneously,  for  each  one  of  them  we  analyze  three
cenarios  for  the  stock  of  debt  (namely,  today’s  level,  a  50%
ncrease,  and  twice  the  stock)  and  other  three  scenarios
or  the  cost  of  debt  (namely,  today’s  level,28 8%  and  12%).
n  the  aggregate,  36  scenarios  for  each  country  are  then
onsidered.
In  contrast  with  Bencek  and  Klodt  (2011),  we  use  data
f  historic  GDP  growth  and  deﬂator,  stock  of  public  debt
nd  market  interest  rates,  and  then  the  different  scenar-
os  of  high  and  low  growth,  inﬂation,  etc.  are  projected
sing  those  historic  rates.  We  believe  these  assumptions  are
ore  realistic  than  using  the  same  average  projections  for
ll  countries,  since  their  current  situation  is  very  different.
able  3  below  summarizes  data  regarding  annual  average
rowth  in  real  terms  and  GDP  deﬂator,29 both  for  a  long
erm  (last  20  years  average)  and  short  term  (last  6  years
verage),  stock  of  public  debt  and  interest  rates  of  public
ebt  at  secondary  markets.30
Based  on  this  historic  data,  the  projections  for  each  of
he  different  scenarios  are  summarized  in  Table  4.
Generally  speaking,  we  set  a  high  growth  context  by  con-
idering  each  country  would  grow  in  the  future  at  the  mean
28 For Portugal and Greece, where interest rates are similar or
uperior to stress levels we have assumed (8 and 12%, respectively),
e only conduct the analysis for the stress levels.
29 We  use growth data by the European Commission (2012) and GDP
eﬂator by Eurostat.
30 Debt data corresponds to December 2011, using Eurostat
atabase, and interest rates correspond to 10-year bonds in sec-
ndary markets, according to ECB data by the end of August 2012.
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istoric  real  economic  growth  of  the  last  20  years,  while  a
ow  growth  scenario  corresponds  to  the  mean  historic  real
rowth  of  the  last  6  years.31 Besides,  we  set  a  moderate
nﬂation  scenario  using  the  historical  average  of  the  GDP
eﬂator  for  the  last  20  years,  and  for  a  low  inﬂation  scenario
sing  the  average  of  the  last  6  years  minus  1%.32 Finally,  we
nalyze  three  scenarios  for  the  stock  of  debt  (today’s  level,
 50%  increase,  and  twice  the  stock)  and  other  three  sce-
arios  for  the  cost  of  debt  (today’s  cost,  8%  and  12%).  The
esults  for  the  case  of  Spain  are  recorded  in  Table  5.
Table  5  is  useful  to  understand  the  effect  of  GDP  growth
n  nominal  terms  over  the  sustainability  of  public  debt.  Dif-
erent  contexts  are  denoted  by  different  colour  (black  text
ndicates  that  the  PSR  required  to  prevent  public  debt  to
ecome  explosive  is  below  the  5%  threshold;  green  text,
hat  it  is  at  about  that  5%;  and  red  text  stands  for  unsus-
ainable  levels  where  the  required  PSR  is  above  5%).  Hence,
n  the  high  growth-moderate  inﬂation  context  (upper  right
orner),  the  Spanish  public  debt  would  be  sustainable  in
even  of  the  nine  scenarios.  This  includes  assuming  twice
he  stock  of  debt  and  a  cost  of  debt  well  above  8%.  For  this
o  be  valid,  the  Spanish  economy  would  have  to  grow  at
 5.5%  annual  nominal  rate,33 which  requires  being  able  to
row  at  a  pace  equivalent  to  the  last  20  years  average,  while
nﬂation  should  be  above  3%.
The  cost  of  debt  Spain  is  paying  at  the  markets  today34
ould  ensure  the  sustainability  of  twice  the  stock  of  debt
up  to  140%  of  GDP)  if  either  the  economic  growth  or  the
nﬂation  are  high  enough  (see  upper  left  and  lower  right  cor-
ers  in  Table  5),  so  nominal  growth  stands  around  3--3.5%.
owever,  if  the  Spanish  economy  remains  stagnant  and  fac-
ng  the  threat  of  deﬂation  (lower  left  corner),  then  nominal
DP  growth  would  not  reach  1%  and  the  government  could
ot  issue  more  debt:  a  stock  of  debt  of  105%  of  GDP  would
equire  paying  5.5%  or  less  for  debt  to  be  sustainable.
In  brief,  Spanish  debt  is  sustainable  in  the  present  con-
ext  --  comparable  to  the  low  growth-moderate  inﬂation
cenario35 (see  shaded  box  in  Table  5) --  with  a required  PSR
f  2.2%.  This  could  admit  even  higher  debt-to-GDP  ratios
31 Exceptions are for the ‘high growth scenario’ of Italy, Greece and
ortugal. Historical data (see Table 3) shows that for these coun-
ries one fundamental macroeconomic problem is that of growth --
articularly for Italy, which experienced a real growth of less than
% during the last 20 years. That is why we correct this by assuming
 ‘high growth scenario’ to be the one where these countries are
ble to grow at 0.5% above their historical mean.
32 The only exception here is Ireland, for which we use its historical
verage during the last 6 years given it is the only country in the
nalysis that is recently showing signs of deﬂation.
33 Note that, for the sake of simplicity and better understanding,
e have added real growth and inﬂation in order to obtain nominal
rowth data. This is obviously just an approximation: for example,
or a real GDP growth of 2.18% and an inﬂation rate of 3.32% we
se a nominal rate for the ‘high growth-high inﬂation’ scenario of
.50%, when the exact value should be 5.57%.
34 About 6.5% for 10-year bonds by August 2012.
35 We  are considering the current situation of the Spanish economy
s equivalent to a context of low growth and high inﬂation (over
%). This statement must be qualiﬁed: 2012 forecasts predict a GDP
ontraction of around 1.5%, well below the zero growth we use at
his scenario.
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Table  5  Results  for  Spain.
Low  inﬂation  Moderate  inﬂation
Debt/GDP  i  g  Debt/GDP  i  g
HIGH  GROWTH 2,5%  70%  6,50%  2,91%  0,7%  70%  6,50%  5,50%
3,6% 70%  8,00%  2,91%  1,8%  70%  8,00%  5,50%
6,4% 70%  12,00%  2,91%  4,6%  70%  12,00%  5,50%
3,8% 105%  6,50%  2,91%  1,1%  105%  6,50%  5,50%
5,3% 105% 8,00%  2,91%  2,6%  105%  8,00%  5,50%
9,5% 105% 12,00%  2,91%  6,8%  105% 12,00%  5,50%
5,0% 140%  6,50%  2,91%  1,4%  140%  6,50%  5,50%
7,1% 140%  8,00%  2,91%  3,5%  140%  8,00%  5,50%
12,7% 140%  12,00%  2,91%  9,1%  140%  12,00%  5,50%
Debt/GDP  i  g  Debt/GDP  i  g
LOW GROWTH 4,0%  70%  6,50%  0,76%  2,2%  70%  6,50%  3,35%
5,1% 70%  8,00%  0,76%  3,3%  70%  8,00%  3,35%
7,9% 70%  12,00%  0,76%  6,1%  70%  12,00%  3,35%
5,0% 105%  5,50%  0,76%  3,3%  105%  6,50%  3,35%
7,6% 105%  8,00%  0,76%  4,9%  105%  8,00%  3,35%
11,8% 105%  12,00%  0,76%  9,1%  105%  12,00%  3,35%
5,0% 140%  4,30%  0,76%  4,4%  140%  6,50%  3,35%
10,1% 140%  8,00%  0,76%  6,5%  140%  8,00%  3,35%
15,7% 140%  12,00%  0,76%  12,1%  140%  12,00%  3,35%
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between  the  higher  the  nominal  growth  the  lower  the
required  PSR.  On  the  right  graph  of  Fig.  3  we  summarize  the
same  relationship,  but  assuming  countries  were  able  to  setSource: Own elaboration.
than  today,  as  long  as  the  economy  does  not  fall  in  a  scenario
of  stagﬂation  and  debt  cost  does  not  soars  above  8%.
Spain  exhibits  the  best  proﬁle  among  the  countries  ana-
lyzed.  The  situation  is  even  better  than  for  Italy  or  Ireland,
countries  that,  however,  are  required  lower  returns  in  the
debt  markets  (see  Tables  6  and  7).
This  methodology  offers  a  simple  interpretation  of  how
economic  growth  and  inﬂation  facilitate  debt  sustainability.
In  the  current  situation  (shaded  boxes  in  Tables  6--9),  only
Italian  debt  would  be  sustainable,  and  barely.  Italy  required
PSR  would  be  almost  5%,  because  Italian  shows  the  high-
est  debt-to-GDP  ratio  of  the  countries  analyzed,  only  below
Greece.
In  turn,  Ireland  needs  to  avoid  the  deﬂation  that  is  facing
since  2008,  in  order  for  current  market  rates  (now  below  6%)
to  be  enough  to  ensure  the  sustainability  of  a  100%  debt-to-
GDP  ratio.  Note  we  are  using  rates  at  secondary  markets:
while  this  is  a  good  approach  to  analyze  whether  countries
would  be  able  to  ﬁnance  themselves  at  the  rates  required
by  the  markets,  these  rates  are  not  a  good  proxy  neither  for
Irish,  Portuguese  nor  Greek  current  public  ﬁnances,  since
they  have  been  already  rescued.
On  the  other  hand,  results  in  Tables  8  and  9  indicate  that
the  situation  is  clearly  unsustainable  for  Greece  and  Portu-
gal,  though  Portugal  has  improved  with  the  recent  fall  of
interest  rates  paid  for  its  debt.From  this  analysis  two  conclusions  are  in  order.  First,  the
high  levels  of  debt  already  accumulated  (110%  by  Ireland  and
Portugal,  120%  by  Italy  and  165%  by  Greece)  are  untenable
in  a  low  growth  scenario:  all  the  lower  left  corners  are  in
c
a
Ged,  with  required  interest  rates  at  levels  unattainable  (Italy
nd  Portugal  would  need  to  pay  only  2--4%,  between  4  and  5%
ould  Ireland  endure  as  long  as  it  does  not  fall  into  deﬂation,
hile  Greece  would  require  an  impossible  1--3%  level).  Being
ble  to  combine  ﬁscal  consolidation  and  economic  measures
hat  enhances  both  their  real  and  economic  growth  is  now
ssential  for  these  four  countries.36 Still,  only  Ireland  would
e  in  a  clearly  solvent  position  in  a  high  growth-moderate
nﬂation  scenario:  Italy,  Portugal  and  particularly  Greece
ould  hardly  endure  higher  levels  of  debt  even  if  they  grow.
rowth  is  urgent  for  these  countries;  deleveraging,  unavoid-
ble.  The  second  conclusion  is  observable  when  we  make  a
olvency  ranking  based  on  the  ability  of  the  ﬁve  countries  in
he  analysis  to  pay  their  debts,  according  to  their  debt-to-
DP  ratios,  growth,  inﬂation  and  market  rates.  The  ranking
from  more  to  less  ability  to  pay)  would  be  Spain,  Italy,  Ire-
and  (quite  close  these  two  countries),  Portugal  and  Greece.
Fig.  3  shows  two  combinations  of  nominal  growth  and
equired  PSR  for  each  country.  The  graph  on  the  left  is
he  current  low  growth-moderate  inﬂation  scenario  most
ountries  are  facing;  we  may  clearly  see  the  correlation36 That is why it is not a nice presage to notice that low growth and
ompetitiveness are endemic indeed in economies like Italy (0.8%
verage growth during the last two decades), Portugal (1.36%) or
reece (1.42%).
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Table  6  Results  for  Italy.
Low  inﬂation  Moderate  inﬂation
Debt/GDP  i  g  Debt/GDP  i  g
HIGH  GROWTH 4,1%  120%  5,80%  2,37%  2,1%  120%  5,80%  4,06%
6,8% 120%  8,00%  2,37%  4,7%  120%  8,00%  4,06%
11,6% 120%  12,00%  2,37%  9,5%  120%  12,00%  4,06%
6,2% 180%  5,80%  2,37%  3,1%  180%  5,80%  4,06%
10,1% 180% 8,00%  2,37%  7,1%  180%  8,00%  4,06%
17,3% 180% 12,00%  2,37%  14,3%  180% 12,00%  4,06%
8,2% 240%  5,80%  2,37%  4,2%  240%  5,80%  4,06%
13,5% 240%  8,00%  2,37%  9,5%  240%  8,00%  4,06%
23,1% 240%  12,00%  2,37%  19,1%  240%  12,00%  4,06%
Debt/GDP  i  g  Debt/GDP  i  g
LOW GROWTH 5,0%  120%  4,50%  0,33%  4,5%  120%  5,80%  2,02%
9,2% 120%  8,00%  0,33%  7,2%  120%  8,00%  2,02%
14,0% 120%  12,00%  0,33%  12,0%  120%  12,00%  2,02%
5,0% 180%  3,10%  0,33%  5,0%  180%  4,80%  2,02%
13,8% 180%  8,00%  0,33%  10,8%  180%  8,00%  2,02%
21,0% 180%  12,00%  0,33%  18,0%  180%  12,00%  2,02%
5,0% 240%  2,40%  0,33%  4,8%  240%  4,00%  2,02%
18,4% 240%  8,00%  0,33%  14,4%  240%  8,00%  2,02%
28,0% 240%  12,00%  0,33%  24,0%  240%  12,00%  2,02%
Source: Own elaboration.
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Figure  3  Two  scenarios  for  GDP  nominal  growth  and  required  PSR.
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hemselves  at  the  high  growth-moderate  inﬂation  scenario,
ombined  with  a  50%  higher  stock  of  debt.37 We  may  see
ow  they  have  improved  --  please  note  the  different  scale
e  used  in  the  left  and  in  the  right  graphs  of  Fig.  3.
The  better  proﬁle  for  the  Spanish  debt  in  our  analysis  is
nconsistent  with  the  higher  cost  of  debt  markets  are  requir-
37 Data for Spain, Italy and Ireland in the right hand side graph use
he same cost of debt as they are paying today. Instead, for Portugal
nd Greece we assume they would be able to improve their ﬁnancing
onditions to an 8% cost of debt.
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ing  compared  to  Italy  or,  in  recent  times,  Ireland.  We  see
 double  reason  for  this.  On  one  hand,  market  concerns
oosted  when,  May  9,  2012,  Bankia  was  nationalized  and
hen  it  was  publicly  announced  that  it  would  require  capi-
al  injections  of  23  billion  euros.  Later,  June  9,  the  Spanish
overnment  announced  it  had  solicited  ﬁnancial  aid  from
he  EU,  up  to  100  billion  euros  to  be  used  in  the  rescue
f  the  banking  sector.  This  shows  the  sustainability  of  the
ublic  debt  depends  not  only  on  the  stock  of  public  debt
ccumulated,  but  also  on  the  stock  of  private  debt  when  it
s  the  public  sector  who  ends  up  guaranteeing  such  private
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Table  7  Results  for  Ireland.
Low  inﬂation  Moderate  inﬂation
Debt/GDP  i  g  Debt/GDP  i  g
HIGH  GROWTH 2,8%  110%  5,90%  3,31%  -1,1%  110%  5,90%  6,86%
5,2% 110%  8,00%  3,31%  1,3%  110%  8,00%  6,86%
9,6% 110%  12,00%  3,31%  5,7%  110%  12,00%  6,86%
4,3% 165%  5,90%  3,31%  -1,6%  165%  5,90%  6,86%
7,7% 165% 8,00%  3,31%  1,9%  165%  8,00%  6,86%
14,3% 165% 12,00%  3,31%  8,5%  165% 12,00%  6,86%
5,7% 220%  5,90%  3,31%  -2,1%  220%  5,90%  6,86%
10,3% 220%  8,00%  3,31%  2,5%  220%  8,00%  6,86%
19,1% 220%  12,00%  3,31%  11,3%  220%  12,00%  6,86%
Debt/GDP i  g  Debt/GDP  i  g
LOW GROWTH 8,6%  110%  5,90%  -1,89%  4,7%  110%  5,90%  1,66%
10,9% 110%  8,00%  -1,89%  7,0%  110%  8,00%  1,66%
15,3% 110%  12,00%  -1,89%  11,4%  110%  12,00%  1,66%
5,1% 165%  1,20%  -1,89%  5,0%  165%  4,70%  1,66%
16,3% 165%  8,00%  -1,89%  10,5%  165%  8,00%  1,66%
22,9% 165%  12,00%  -1,89%  17,1%  165%  12,00%  1,66%
5,0% 220%  0,40%  -1,89%  5,1%  220%  4,00%  1,66%
21,8% 220%  8,00%  -1,89%  13,9%  220%  8,00%  1,66%
30,6% 220%  12,00%  -1,89%  22,7%  220%  12,00%  1,66%
Source: Own elaboration.
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Figure  4  Public  deﬁcit  and  primary  surplus  (PSR)  of  Italy  and
S
Sdebt  --  particularly  from  the  banking  sector.38 On  the  other
hand,  Spain  is  facing  a  problem  of  credibility  to  balance  its
public  ﬁnances.  Bencek  and  Klodt  (2011)’s  methodology  is
based  on  empirical  evidence  about  the  5%  PSR  threshold
beyond  which  it  becomes  extremely  difﬁcult  to  avoid  debt
growth  from  becoming  explosive.  However,  a  5%  primary  sur-
plus  is  certainly  a  very  demanding  level  to  achieve:  Italy,  for
instance,  has  been  able  to  generate  primary  surpluses  during
the  last  decades,  what  improves  its  credibility  to  the  eyes
of  the  market39;  Spain,  on  the  contrary  (see  Fig.  4),  could
not  improve  its  public  deﬁcit  after  two  years  of  austerity
measures  (−9.3%  in  2010  and  −9.4%  in  2011  according  to
the  most  recent  update).  Primary  deﬁcit  was  −6.1%  in  2011,
and  it  was  expected  to  be  only  at  −3%  in  2012  even  if  the
objectives  set  by  the  European  authorities  are  fulﬁlled.To  summarize,  our  analysis  suggests  that  governments
could  have  higher  ability  to  make  public  debt  sustainable
in  a  context  of  high  growth  and  moderate  inﬂation.  Sustain-
38 Indeed, the last IMF ﬁscal monitor available at the time of writing
this article (July 2012, IMF, 2012b) forecasted an increase in the
debt-to-GDP ratio of Spain from 68.5% in 2011 to 90.3% in 2012.
This forecast corrected the previous estimation in April (IMF, 2012a)
by more than 11 percentage points -- a rise that would correspond,
largely, with the debt assumed after the banking sector bailout.
39 Recall the results in Table 1, where Italy exhibits the best result
after Germany in terms of the Barometer of debt. This was a result
mainly of Italian ability to generate positive PSRs.
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ource:  ECB  Statistical  Data  Warehouse.
bility  also  depends  on  the  credibility  markets  judge  about
he  ability  of  governments  to  balance  their  budget,  as  well  as
n  the  effect  that  private  sector  debt  might  have  over  pub-
ic  ﬁnances.  Growth,  inﬂation,  credibility  and  deleverage  of
rivate  sector  would  be,  henceforth,  desirable  outcomes  in
rder  to  guarantee  the  sustainability  of  public  debt.
However,  this  is  not  the  end  of  the  debate.  Indeed,  it  is
nly  the  beginning.  On  one  hand,  the  necessity  of  a  higher
rowth  takes  us  back  to  the  debate  about  how  to  achieve  it:
rough  expansionary  ﬁscal  policies  that  make  use  of  a  high
overnment  spending  multiplier?;  through  austerity  mea-
ures  that  increase  the  market  conﬁdence?  On  the  other
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Table  8  Results  for  Portugal.
Low  inﬂation  Moderate  inﬂation
Debt/GDP  i  g  Debt/GDP  i  g
HIGH  GROWTH 5,2%  110%  7,00%  2,31%
6,3%  110%  8,00%  2,31%  4,5%  110%  8,00%  3,90%
10,7% 110%  12,00%  2,31%  8,9%  110%  12,00%  3,90%
4,9% 165%  5,30%  2,31%  5,1%  165%  7,00%  3,90%
9,4% 165% 8,00%  2,31%  6,8%  165%  8,00%  3,90%
16,0% 165% 12,00%  2,31%  13,4%  165% 12,00%  3,90%
4,8% 220%  4,50%  2,31%  5,1%  220%  6,20%  3,90%
12,5% 220%  8,00%  2,31%  9,0%  220%  8,00%  3,90%
21,3% 220%  12,00%  2,31%  17,8%  220%  12,00%  3,90%
Debt/GDP i  g  Debt/GDP  i  g
LOW GROWTH 5,1%  110%  4,40%  -0,22%  4,9%  110%  5,80%  1,37%
9,0% 110%  8,00%  -0,22%  7,3%  110%  8,00%  1,37%
13,4% 110%  12,00%  -0,22%  9,4%  110%  9,90%  1,37%
5,0% 165%  2,80%  -0,22%  5,0%  165%  4,40%  1,37%
13,6% 165%  8,00%  -0,22%  10,9%  165%  8,00%  1,37%
20,2% 165%  12,00%  -0,22%  17,5%  165%  12,00%  1,37%
4,9% 220%  2,00%  -0,22%  4,9%  220%  3,60%  1,37%
18,1% 220%  8,00%  -0,22%  14,6%  220%  8,00%  1,37%
26,9% 220%  12,00%  -0,22%  23,4%  220%  12,00%  1,37%
Source: Own elaboration.
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land,  the  favourable  effect  of  a  moderate  inﬂation  has  the
upport  of  some  economists  (the  Keynesian  literature,  basi-
ally),  but  only  a  negative  answer  from  European  authorities
nd  some  other  economists,  who  consider  that  the  potential
amages  of  inﬂation  (lower  credibility  of  monetary  policy,
ower  capital  inﬂows  in  the  future,  the  possibility  of  a  inﬂa-
ionary  spiral,  etc.)  are  more  important  than  its  beneﬁts.  In
ny  case,  this  is  an  approach  more  accepted  in  Europe  than
n  other  regions,  since  as  it  is  well  known  the  FED  and  other
entral  banks  do  have  a  double  macroeconomic  objective  of
table  inﬂation  and  higher  growth.  Besides,  we  should  not
orget  it  is  true  that  capital  does  not  like  inﬂation,  since  it
rodes  its  purchasing  power,  but  scarier  would  be  the  pos-
ibility  of  a  default  to  occur  --  a  potential  scenario  if  the
xplosiveness  of  public  debt  is  not  avoided.
. Comparing our results with those of the
MF’s  The good, the bad and the ugly
he  recent  IMF’s  World  Economic  Outlook  (IMF,  2012d)  iden-
iﬁes  all  advanced  economy  episodes40 since  1875  that  begin
40 Emerging markets and developing economies were not included
n the analysis for comparison purposes: their public debt was mostly
xternal and denominated in foreign currency, while their economic
tructures and institutions can differ substantially.
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ehen  gross  public  debt  rises  above  100%  of  GDP,41 from  Italy
876  to  Japan  1997.  The  analysis  of  26  episodes  during  the
0th  century  where  the  debt-to-GDP  ratios  rose  above  the
00%  threshold  aims  to  see  what  happened  next  when  differ-
nt  policies  were  implemented  in  order  to  deleverage  public
nances,  some  of  them  were  successful  while  others  were
ot  able  to  prevent  public  debt  from  continuing  to  increase.
eyond  this  analysis,  six  case  studies  out  of  those  26  episodes
ere  also  discussed  in  detail.  These  in-depth  case  studies
over  a  full  range  of  policy  approaches  and  economic  out-
omes,  allowing  us  to  compare  the  relative  effectiveness  of
ifferent  policies  implemented.
The  analysis  shows  that  the  range  of  experiences  is  broad,
ncluding  cases  where  debt  was  reduced  by  60%  but  also
here  it  increased  90%.  The  median  debt  ratio  does  tend
o  fall,  but  only  at  a  moderate  pace:  after  15  years,  the
edian  debt-to-GDP  ratio  is  only  about  10  percentage  points
ower.  Additionally,  this  pattern  of  falling  median  debt  ratios
nly  holds  for  high  levels  of  debt;  the  same  analysis  using 60%  threshold  evidences  the  median  debt  level  shows  no
endency  to  decrease  (with  the  average  debt  level  being
ctually  higher).
41 The 100% threshold is used because of three reasons: because its
elevance today, because it is a relatively high historical threshold
only 15% if the observations in IMF’s database were above that
evel), and because the analysis shows authorities do not tend to
xert downward pressure on debt until it reaches that threshold.
Fiscal  consolidation  and  the  sustainability  of  public  debt  in  the  GIPSI  countries  67
Table  9  Results  for  Greece.
Low  inﬂation  Moderate  inﬂation
Debt/GDP  i  g  Debt/GDP  i  g
HIGH  GROWTH 5,2%  165%  7,00%  3,82%  4,6%  145%  8,00%  4,81%
6,9% 165%  8,00%  3,82%  4,4%  165%  8,00%  5,32%
13,5% 165%  12,00%  3,82%  11,0%  165%  12,00%  5,32%
4,9% 248%  5,80%  3,82%  5,0%  218%  7,60%  5,32%
10,3% 248% 8,00%  3,82%  6,6%  248%  8,00%  5,32%
20,2% 248% 12,00%  3,82%  16,5%  248% 12,00%  5,32%
4,9% 330%  5,30%  3,82%  4,9%  290%  7,00%  5,32%
13,8% 330%  8,00%  3,82%  8,8%  330%  8,00%  5,32%
27,0% 330%  12,00%  3,82%  22,0%  330%  12,00%  5,32%
Debt/GDP i  g  Debt/GDP  i  g
LOW GROWTH 5,1%  165%  2,40%  -0,67%  4,9%  165%  3,80%  0,83%
14,3% 165%  8,00%  -0,67%  11,8%  165%  8,00%  0,83%
20,9% 165%  12,00%  -0,67%  38,2%  165%  24,00%  0,83%
5,1% 248%  1,40%  -0,67%  4,9%  248%  2,80%  0,83%
21,5% 248%  8,00%  -0,67%  17,7%  248%  8,00%  0,83%
31,4% 248%  12,00%  -0,67%  27,6%  248%  12,00%  0,83%
4,9% 330%  0,80%  -0,67%  4,9%  330%  2,30%  0,83%
28,6% 330%  8,00%  -0,67%  23,7%  330%  8,00%  0,83%
41,8% 330%  12,00%  -0,67%  36,9%  330%  12,00%  0,83%
Source: Own elaboration.
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signiﬁcantly  higher  during  episodes  where  the  debt-to-GDP
ratio  decreases  (2.4%)  than  when  it  increases  (1.2%).  On
the  other  hand,  the  relationship  between  inﬂation  and  debt
42 A result consistent with Reinhart and Rogoff (2010b)’s ﬁndings.The  analysis  uses  a  dynamic  interpretation  of  the  golden
rule  of  debt  in  order  to  analyze  the  evolution  of  debt-to-
GDP  ratios  through  time  and  determine  which  factors  affect
them  and  how  much.  The  dynamic  equation  is  given  by
Dt = 1 +  it(1  +  t)  ×  (1  +  gt) × Dt−1 −  PDRt +  et, (2)
where  Dt is  the  level  of  debt  in  period  t,  it denotes  inter-
est  rate,  t stands  for  the  inﬂation  rate  of  the  GDP  deﬂator,
PDRt  is  the  primary  deﬁcit  ratio  (we  may  alternatively  use
PSRt  with  a  negative  sign),  and  et is  a  residual  that  takes  into
account  valuation  effects  and  other  accounting  adjustments
not  fully  captured  by  changes  in  the  primary  deﬁcit.  The
other  variables  are  similar  to  those  in  Eq.  (1),  with  it here
being  in  nominal  terms  and  gt in  real  terms.  The  decompo-
sition  of  debt  dymanics  is  based  on  a  linearized  version  of
(2).  The  results  observed  are  as  follows.  First,  the  difference
between  the  real  interest  rate  and  the  real  GDP  growth  plays
a  crucial  role  in  determining  the  stability  of  public  debt.
For  the  22  advanced  economies  in  the  database,  the  aver-
age  difference  was  −0.7%.  Besides,  primary  deﬁcits  respond
slowly  to  changes  in  debt;  hence  the  evolution  of  the  stock  of
debt  tends  to  be  quite  persistent  and  to  undergo  large,  long
swings.  Second,  the  largest  debt  reductions  were  a  result  of
high  inﬂation  in  most  cases,  while  in  the  rest  this  was  still
an  important  contributor  to  debt  reduction.  However,  there
is  no  clear  correlation  between  growth  and  debt  reduc-
tion  in  this  group  of  high-debt  episodes.  Third,  when  these
t
e
bountries  reached  high  levels  of  debt,  their  ﬁscal  balances
nd  inﬂation  rates  differed  considerably.  However,  the  more
odern  episodes  are  much  more  tightly  clustered,  with  mod-
st  inﬂation  rate  and  modest  primary  surplus.  Fourth,  while
ntering  a  high-debt  phase  is  usually  followed  by  relatively
ow  growth,42 the  study  yields  two  additional  observations:
t  matters  whether  a  country’s  debt  level  is  increasing  or
ecreasing  (decreasing  levels  of  debt  are  correlated  with
eriods  of  better  growth  performance,  a result  particularly
triking  for  debt  levels  between  90  and  115%  of  GDP),  and
hen  this  dichotomy  increasing  versus  decreasing  debt  is
ntroduced,  there  is  no  particular  threshold  that  consistently
recedes  subpar  growth  performance.43
When  the  26  episodes  are  separated  into  two  broad  cat-
gories,  those  in  which  debt  levels  increased  and  those  in
hich  they  decreased  (see  Tables  10  and  11),  three  comple-
entary  results  can  be  drawn.
On  one  hand,  debt  reduction  ultimately  requires  primary
urpluses.  Indeed,  the  primary  ﬁscal  surplus  is,  on  average,43 The report stresses that they do not mean to dispute the notion
hat, all else equal, higher levels of debt may lead to higher inter-
st rates. Rather, it highlights that there is no simple relationship
etween debt and growth.
68  M.  Antelo,  D.  Peón
Table  10  Episodes  with  an  overall  reduction  in  debt  to  GDP  over  15  years.
Start  year  Change  in  debt-to-GDP  (%)  GDP  growth  (%)  Inﬂation  (%)  PSR  (as  %  of  GDP)
Germany  1918  −129  1.2  1.4  ×  1010 . . .
Japan 1942  −96  0.7  91.4  3.8
Ireland 1986  −74  6.1  2.8  3.5
Italy 1942  −68  2.8  41.5  . . .
U.S. 1946  −68  1.4  3.0  1.7
Greece 1931  −57  −2.8  90.0  3.5
Belgium 1940  −55  2.2  3.1  0.7
Italy 1919  −43  0.1  2.7  2.0
Spain 1898  −27 1.1 0.3  3.9
Israel 1977  −22 2.2 .  .  . . . .
Belgium 1921  −22 1.3 4.8 0.8
Canada  1995  −18  1.7  1.9  2.0
Netherlands  1887  −15  0.1  −0.2  1.3
France 1884  −13  1.7  −0.6  3.3
Italy 1992  −2  1.3  2.8  2.8
Average −47  1.4  1.0  ×  109 2.4
Excluding hyperinﬂation  −33  1.8  2.1  2.2
Source: IMF (2012d).
Table  11  Episodes  with  an  overall  increase  in  debt  to  GDP  over  15  years.
Start  year  Change  in  debt  to  GDP  (%)  GDP  growth  (%)  Inﬂation  (%)  PSR  (as  %  of  GDP)
Italy  1876  4  0.6  −0.2  4.1
Belgium 1983  8  2.0  2.5  2.1
Greece 1993  10  3.3  4.7  0.4
New Zealand  1884  28  0.6  −1.6  . .  .
Canada 1932  29  4.5  2.1  −3.7
New Zealand  1909  36  0.5  3.8  . .  .
France 1916  50  1.4  11.0  4.2
Greece 1888  75  1.4  2.3  0.5
U.K. 1918  75  −0.2  −4.8  8.2
Netherlands  1932  109  0.0  4.7  0.5
Japan 1997  131  0.5  −0.3  −5.4
Average −47 1.3  2.2  1.2
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eduction  becomes  more  ambiguous.  While  hyperinﬂation44
s  clearly  associated  with  sharp  debt  reduction,  when  hyper-
nﬂation  episodes  are  excluded  there  is  no  clear  association.
inally,  relatively  stronger  growth  performance  is  now  asso-
iated  with  debt  reduction  when  hyperinﬂation  episodes  are
xcluded.
Another  relevant  result  for  the  purposes  of  this  paper  is
hat  though  the  analysis  shows  no  clear  association  between
nﬂation  and  debt  reduction  when  hyperinﬂation  episodes
re  excluded,  it  is  observable  from  the  data  above  that  no
eﬂation  episodes  are  related  to  a  debt  reduction  scenario.
he  lowest  inﬂation  associated  with  an  overall  reduction  in
ebt-to-GDP  ratio  are  France  1884  (−0.6%)  and  Netherlands
−0.2%),  while  the  lowest  observation  in  all  the  20th  century
s  Canada  1995,  with  an  inﬂation  of  1.9%.  All  these  three
44 Hyperinﬂation here is deﬁned as an annual inﬂation above 40%.
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tpisodes  are  associated  with  the  lowest  effect  over  debt
eduction,  about  15%  (see  Table  10).  On  the  contrary,  four
eﬂation  episodes  are  associated  with  an  overall  increase  in
he  ratio  (see  Table  11).
This  ﬁnding  is  also  consistent  with  the  evidence  from
he  six  case  studies  analyzed  in  detail.  These  are  the  U.K.
918,  the  U.S.  1946,  Belgium  1983,  Italy  1992,  Canada  1995
nd  Japan  1997.  These  episodes  cover  the  full  range  of
acroeconomic  policy  approaches  and  reﬂect  the  full  range
f  outcomes.  In  particular,  the  report  stresses  that  the  U.K.
918  experience  provides  important  lessons  about  ﬁscal
usterity  and  the  difﬁculties  created  by  deﬂation,  though
he  Japan  1997  similar  experience  shows  this  lesson  has
ot  been  consigned  to  the  dustbin  of  history.  After  World
ar  I,  the  U.K.  authorities  implemented  a  policy  mix  ofarge  expenditure  decreases  and  tight  monetary  inﬂation
rising  interest  rates  to  7%).  This  caused  weak  growth,  high
nemployment  and  deﬂation.  Primary  surpluses  contributed
o  reduce  debt  about  7  percentage  points  a  year,  but  they
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were  easily  overwhelmed  by  deﬂation  and  high  interest
rates,  which  added  12.  As  a  consequence,  debt  continued
to  rise:  it  was  not  until  1990  that  debt  approached  its
pre-World  War  I  level.
The  outcome  of  the  U.K.  policy  mix  is  more  clearly
attributed  to  the  monetary  stance  when  compared  to  the
cases  of  Japan  and  U.S.  Japan  implemented  tight  mone-
tary  conditions  and  loose  ﬁscal  conditions  and  failed;  the
U.S.,  instead,  succeeded  with  loose  monetary  conditions
and  tight  ﬁscal  conditions.  Clearly,  our  results  in  Section  3
are  coherent  with  the  most  relevant  historical  ﬁnding  in  the
IMF  paper:  low  growth  and  deﬂation  make  success  of  ﬁscal
consolidation  really  hard  to  achieve.  Besides,  the  ‘ﬁnancial
repression’  approach  implemented  by  American  authorities
(a  bond-support  programme  which  placed  a  ﬂoor  under  the
price  of  government  bonds,  preventing  the  Federal  Reserve
from  raising  interest  rates  to  control  inﬂation)  would  support
the  idea  that  ECB  should  be  buying  bonds  of  the  peripheral
countries  in  the  Eurozone.45 Finally,  the  Japanese  experi-
ence  also  highlights  the  need  to  deal  with  banking  sector
weakness  -- an  ongoing  strategy  now  in  the  Eurozone.
Comparing  our  results  with  those  of  the  IMF’s  analysis  we
may  propose  a  set  of  policy  recommendations  for  the  GIPSI
countries.  The  six  most  important  would  be  as  follows:
(1)  High  levels  of  debt  reduce  potential  GDP  growth,  with
this  relationship  being  more  clear  when  debt  contin-
ues  to  increase.  The  GIPSI  countries  have  all  reached
high  levels  of  debt  and/or  they  are  increasing  their  debt
stocks.  Therefore,  a  strategy  for  these  countries  to  stop
this  performance  somehow  seems  now  a  clear  necessity.
(2)  The  difference  between  the  real  interest  rate  and  the
real  GDP  growth  plays  a  crucial  role  in  determining
the  stability  of  public  debt.  Given  the  high  risk  pre-
mia  GIPSI  countries  are  required  to  pay,  higher  nominal
growth  rates  are  desirable,  as  well  as  the  support  of
the  European  authorities  (ECB  intervention,  bailout  pro-
grammes)  to  temporarily  reduce  the  cost  of  debt.
(3)  Debt  reduction  requires  primary  surpluses,  but  primary
deﬁcits  have  historically  responded  slowly  to  changes  in
debt.  GIPSI  countries  must  learn  the  lessons  of  history
and  focus  on  reducing  deﬁcits,  but  do  it  only  as  long  as
it  does  not  damages  growth.  Hence,  smooth  and  gradual
consolidations  are  to  be  preferred.
(4)  High  growth  helps  reducing  the  burden  of  debt,  and  it
has  been  indeed  associated  with  debt  reduction  when
hyperinﬂation  episodes  are  excluded.(5)  The  largest  debt  reductions  have  been  a  result  of  high
inﬂation,  but  today  we  know  episodes  of  hyperinﬂa-
tion  are  not  desirable.  When  hyperinﬂation  episodes  are
excluded  there  is  mixed  evidence  between  low  inﬂation
45 This idea is supported by several authors, like Reinhart and
Sbrancia (2011) and Reinhart et al. (2011). However, the IMF consid-
ers less clear this approach would be applied in today’s economic
environment. To mitigate the rise in inﬂation, the US authorities
introduced consumer credit limits and there was a call for volun-
tary restraints on bank credit. The set of controls and regulations
that would be equivalent today for this ﬁnancial repression to be
effective would lead to a less internationally integrated ﬁnancial
system.
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and  debt  reduction.  However,  a  clear  result  is  that  no
deﬂation  episodes  have  been  associated  with  a  debt
reduction  scenario.  In  particular,  the  experiences  by  the
UK  1918  and  Japan  1997  provide  important  lessons  about
ﬁscal  austerity  and  the  difﬁculties  created  by  deﬂation.
6)  Finally,  the  external  environment  has  been  an  impor-
tant  contributor  to  outcomes  in  the  past.  However,
things  are  not  looking  so  good  today:  IMF  mentions  the
widespread  consolidation  efforts,  deleveraging  pres-
sures  from  the  private  sector  and  adverse  demographic
trends  as  handicaps  for  GIPSI  countries  in  the  future.
European  authorities  and  European  countries  should  be
aware  of  this,  promoting  economic  policies  in  accor-
dance  with  what  GIPSI  countries  need.
The  IMF  report  concludes  with  the  analysis  of  Belgium
983,  Italy  1992,  and  Canada  1995  experiences.  They  are
hown  to  be  good  examples  that  debt  can  also  be  reduced  in
 context  of  low  to  moderate  inﬂation.  The  economic  poli-
ies  should  then  focus  on  both  implementing  appropriate
tructural  reforms  that  boost  growth  and  achieve  primary
urplus,  while  monetary  policy  should  be  as  supportive  as
ossible.  That  is  basically  what  our  results  in  Section  3
escribe:  achieving  primary  surplus  is  an  essential  goal  as
ong  as  it  does  not  damages  growth,  and  this  is  also  a  double-
ided  lesson  --  low  growth  and  deﬂation  make  success  of
scal  consolidation  really  hard  to  achieve.  Finally,  the  Euro-
one  should  help  making  the  external  environment  more
uitable  for  the  GIPSI  countries  to  succeed.  This  includes
o  postpone  the  ﬁscal  consolidation  of  the  European  core
ountries,  a  more  supportive  monetary  policy,  accepting
igher  levels  of  inﬂation  in  countries  with  trade  surplus,
nd  ﬁscal  stimuli  though  the  budget  of  the  EU,  the  Euro-
ean  Investment  Bank  and  several  other  mechanisms  that
elp  peripheral  countries  to  achieve  the  economic  growth
hey  need.
.  Concluding remarks
n  this  paper  we  surveyed  the  theoretical  and  empirical  lit-
rature  on  public  sector  deleverage  and  ﬁscal  consolidation,
nd  summarized  the  main  consensus  available  regarding  the
egative  effects  of  high  public  debt  levels  over  economic
erformance,  the  requirements  for  debt  to  be  sustainable,
he  role  of  debt  as  a  ﬁscal  policy  tool,  and  the  strengths  and
eaknesses  of  ﬁscal  consolidations.
We  also  examined  several  macroeconomic  scenarios,
sing  data  from  the  peripheral  countries  in  the  Eurozone
the  so-called  GIPSI  countries),  in  order  to  better  understand
he  growth  versus  austerity  dilemma.  We  show  the  ability  to
eleverage  is  higher  for  high  levels  of  growth  and  moder-
te  levels  of  inﬂation.  We  provide  a  solvency  ranking  based
n  our  analysis,  but  observe  Italy  and  Ireland  are  paying  a
ower  risk  premium  compared  to  Spain,  contrary  to  what
ur  results  would  suggest.  We  see  a  double  reason  for  this:
he  sustainability  of  public  debt  is  also  affected  by  private
ndebtedness,  particularly  when  it  is  the  public  sector  who
nds  up  guaranteeing  these  private  debts;  and  Spain  faces
 lack  of  credibility  to  balance  its  public  ﬁnances  --  unlike
taly,  for  instance.
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Finally,  and  by  comparing  our  results  with  those  of  IMF
2012d)’s  study,  we  proposed  a  set  of  policy  recommenda-
ions  for  the  GIPSI  countries.  These  recommendations  can  be
ecorded  as  follows.  First,  a  strategy  to  reduce  GIPSI  coun-
ries’  high  levels  of  debt  and/or  increasing  debt  stocks  is
ow  urgent.  Second,  the  high  risk  premia  these  countries  are
equired  to  pay  at  the  markets  make  higher  nominal  growth
ates  necessary.  Support  by  the  European  authorities  (ECB
ntervention,  bailout  programmes)  to  temporarily  reduce
he  cost  of  debt  would  also  be  desirable.  Third,  GIPSI  coun-
ries  must  learn  the  lessons  of  history  and  focus  on  reducing
eﬁcits  by  obtaining  primary  surpluses,  but  only  as  long  as  it
oes  not  damage  growth.  Hence,  smooth  and  gradual  consol-
dations  are  to  be  preferred.  Fourth,  hyperinﬂation  episodes
re  not  desirable,  but  neither  deﬂation:  the  experiences  by
he  U.K.  1918  and  Japan  1997  show  the  difﬁculties  created
y  deﬂation.  Fifth,  GIPSI  countries  urge  a  gentle  external
nvironment.  The  Eurozone  should  postpone  the  ﬁscal  con-
olidations  by  the  European  core  countries,  promote  a  more
upportive  monetary  policy,  accept  higher  levels  of  inﬂa-
ion  in  countries  with  trade  surplus,  and  implement  ﬁscal
timuli  that  help  peripheral  (GIPSI)  countries  to  achieve  the
conomic  growth  they  need.  Finally,  GIPSI  countries  should
ocus  in  the  meantime  their  efforts  on  implementing  appro-
riate  structural  reforms  that  boost  growth  and  achieve
scal  consolidation.
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